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1. Introduction
This paper examines the response of the components of firms' total labour compensation to Total
Factor Productivity (TFP) at the microeconomic level. More specifically, we investigate the impact
of TFP on firms' real wage bill per employee (average labour compensation), firms' employment,
total hours worked, as well as real labour compensation per hour (hourly labour compensation) and
hours worked per employee. We distinguish between idiosyncratic firm-level TFP and aggregated
sector-level TFP and evaluate and compare the elasticity of average labour compensation and
labour to both firm-specific TFP and to sector-level TFP. Because average labour compensation
vary with changes in the workforce composition as well as with variations in wages, our empirical
specification includes control variables related to workforce composition. Therefore, the response
of average labour compensation to TFP, after controlling for workforce composition, is mainly
driven by changes in wages.
  We find low response of average labour compensation and a high elasticity of labour to firm-
specific TFP. This is consistent with the existence of real wage rigidity. Wage rigidity implies that
wages have a smaller and more sluggish response to economic shocks than flexible wages. There
are several reasons for wage rigidity and it can manifest itself in various ways, as the following
examples show. Multi-period contracts may imply that wages do not respond to contemporaneous
shocks. The resistance to wage cuts may imply reduced sensitivity to adverse shocks. This so-
called downward wage rigidity may even reduce the sensitivity of wages to favourable shocks
(Elsby, 2006). A sluggish response of wages may also be the outcome of wage bargaining
between risk-averse workers and risk-neutral firms, leading to "wage insurance" (Azariadis (1975)).
  Recent microeconomic research highlights the existence of various forms of wage rigidity.
Firstly, Guiso et al. (2005), Cardoso and Portela (2005) and Katay (2007) provide microeconomic
evidence that firms do insure workers against temporary firm-specific shocks to productivity. Note
that firms can afford wage insurance only against temporary rather than permanent shocks.
Second, recent evidence on downward wage rigidity in Belgium can be found in Dickens et al.
(2006, 2007), Du Caju et al. (2007) and Knoppik and Beissinger (2005). These papers point to high
downward real wage rigidity in Belgium. This is attributable mainly to the full automatic indexation
of base wages. We therefore focus on adjustment of real labour compensation.
  Models with real wage rigidity typically find wider variability of employment in response to
productivity shock, as compared to the flexible wage scenario (see for example Blanchard and Galí
(2007, 2008), Boldrin and Horvath (1995) or Hall (2005)). In addition to wage rigidities, other
frictions alter the functioning of labour markets. Hiring and firing costs together with training
expenses may generate considerable employment adjustment costs that impede labour
adjustment. Which of the two constraints - wage rigidity or employment adjustment costs - is more
binding has to be determined on empirical grounds.
  This question is also relevant for inflation dynamics and monetary policy, as shown in the most
recent strand of New Keynesian models. Examining jointly real wage rigidity and employment
protection, Christoffel and Linzert (2005) show that, on the one hand, real wage rigidity increases2
the adjustment via the employment margin and explains inflation persistence. On the other hand,
employment protection tends to smooth out labour flows, raise the volatility of wages following a
monetary policy shock, increase the response of inflation, and thereby lower the persistence of
inflation. Further, in the absence of wage rigidity, these models predict that the central bank should
fully stabilise inflation at all times and at any cost (Goodfriend and King (1997)). On the contrary,
price lumpiness (Christiano et al. (2005)), and real wage rigidity (Blanchard and Galí (2007, 2008))
generate inflation inertia and persistence of fluctuations in hours and output. Therefore, following
an adverse economic shock, the monetary authority must decide whether to accommodate a
higher level of inflation or, instead, keep inflation constant but allow for a larger decline in the
output gap and employment. Pure inflation targeting is no longer the optimal monetary policy,
which should rather aim at reducing, but not eliminating, the volatility of both inflation and
unemployment.
  In addition the degree of price stickiness may influence the employment adjustment
mechanisms. First, under monopolistic competition conditions and flexible prices, a positive
technology shock leads to a price reduction, an increase in demand and thereby a rise in output
and labour demand. As discussed above, real wage rigidity may exacerbate the response of output
and labour. Second, in a situation of price stickiness, prices and therefore demand remain
unchanged. Following a positive productivity shock, the same volume of output is then produced
using a smaller amount of labour (provided the shock is not offset by expansionary monetary policy
action for instance, or that firms do not store unsold goods in expectation of future price change
and increase in demand). Lastly, a negative relationship between technology shocks and labour
may be also explained by a low elasticity of demand, high market power or a short-run negative
impact on production due to necessary adaptation of stock and/or quality of labour and capital. For
example, Francis and Ramey (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007) point out that habit formation
in consumption and adjustment costs in investment may induce a negative relationship between
hours worked and technology.
  The aim of this paper is to estimate the sensitivity of firm-level average real labour
compensation per worker (referred to as average labour compensation hereafter), employment and
hours to changes in firm-specific TFP, as well as in sector-level TFP. The main variables are
obtained from companies' annual accounts and social balance sheet recorded in Belgium over the
period 1997-2005. We estimate dynamic equations for average labour compensation, employment,
total hours worked, as well as hours per worker and hourly labour compensation. The equations
include TFP measures, as well as variables related to the workforce composition, firm size, and the
capital stock, together with variables that capture sector-level fluctuations. TFP is measured
through the growth accounting framework of Ackerberg et al. (2006) and corrected for fluctuations
in hours per worker to account for variable utilisation of production factors (Basu and Kimball
(1997)). Note that we use firm-level information on average labour compensation rather than
individual earnings data. The advantage of using individual earnings data is that changes in wages
cannot be confused with changes in the workforce composition. The main drawback is that wage
changes can only be constructed for job stayers, while our approach also takes into account new3
entrants and workers that leave the firm together with permanent job-stayers when measuring
average labour compensation changes. We believe that from the point of view of a firm, the
relevant adjustment variable following a TFP shock is the average labour compensation rather than
workers' individual wages, although changes in the composition of the labour force might have an
impact on firm's productivity. We acknowledge this point by including control variables for labour
force composition in our models.
  First, we examine the relative sensitivity of average labour compensation and labour to firm-
specific TFP changes. The finding of a small elasticity of average labour compensation and a large
elasticity of labour to TFP supports the hypothesis that real wages are rigid. Two caveats should be
mentioned here. One is that there is no theoretical reference point for the relative elasticity of
wages and labour in cases of perfect wage flexibility. The other is that TFP measures may capture
technology as well as demand shocks and input price shocks (see Klette and Griliches (1996),
Katayama et al. (2003) and Foster et al. (2008)). Demand shocks will tend to induce a positive
correlation with labour and a smaller correlation with wages (except to the extent that demand
shocks raise profits and wages through rent-sharing mechanisms). Few recent papers look at
these questions at the microeconomic level. Duhautois and Kramarz (2006) and Fuss (2008)
examine the relative importance of average wage and employment flows in wage bill adjustment
but do not estimate the elasticity of labour compensation and employment.
  Second, we compare the elasticity of average labour compensation with respect to firm-specific
and sector-level TFP, and explore the role of sector-level collective wage agreements in shaping
the response of average labour compensation. To our knowledge there is no paper investigating
differentiated behaviour of labour compensation and employment at idiosyncratic as opposed to
aggregate level. The finding of a higher elasticity of average labour compensation to aggregate
sector-level TFP than to idiosyncratic TFP highlights the role of centralisation and coordination of
wage bargaining in facilitating wage adjustment.1 It also stresses the fact that the importance of
sector-level collective bargaining for wage-setting in Belgium may strongly limit the scope for firm-
level adjustment. Lastly, it is consistent with the view that firms compete on the labour market to
hire and keep workers, which makes them reluctant to undertake individual wage cuts, for
effciiency wage or shirking considerations. Also, it may arise under a competitive product market
environment in which firms may not afford wage increases because they will not be able to raise
their prices if their competitors do not.
  Third, by providing microeconomic estimates of the elasticity of hours to TFP, we contribute to
the debate on the sign of the relationship between hours worked and technological change.
Previous firm-level analyses of the impact of TFP on growth in hours suggest that a current TFP
shock has a negative impact on hours, although the effect of lagged TFP is positive and
compensates for the initial negative effect (Marchetti and Nucci (2005, 2007), and Carlsson and
Smedsaas (2007)). This supports the hypothesis of sticky prices. One caveat of our exercise, as
1   This argument can be traced back to Bruno and Sachs (1985) who find that countries with more
centralised wage bargaining find it easier to adjust real wages to adverse macroeconomic shocks.4
well as those cited above, is again that TFP measures may capture demand shocks together with
technological changes.
  Our results may be summarised as follows: (1) the elasticity of average labour compensation
with respect to TFP is close to zero, while the elasticity of labour is high. This is in line with the
existence of real wage rigidity. Compared with microeconomic evidence for other European
countries, our estimates of the average labour compensation sensitivity are in the lower range; (2)
the elasticity of average labour compensation with respect to sector-level TFP is much larger than
that of firm-level TFP.  We relate this finding to the fact that the wage dynamics in Belgium is
mostly driven by sector-level collective agreements; (3) we provide microeconomic evidence that
hours respond positively to technological changes within the year.
  The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the Belgian labour
market institutions, introduces the data and describes the methodology. Section 3 presents our
main results. Robustness tests with respect to alternative measures of TFP and specifications are
discussed in Section 4, while Section 5 concludes. Technical details on the construction of the
dataset and measurement of TFP shocks are included in Appendix A.
2. Institutions, data and methodology
2.1  Institutional features of the Belgian labour market
In this section, we briefly introduce the main features of the Belgian labour market that are relevant
for the interpretation of our results. Notable characteristics of the wage formation process in
Belgium include the minimum wage, automatic indexation, a cap on average wage increases, and
sectoral collective bargaining. As far as employment is concerned, strict employment protection
may be eased by early retirement, temporary unemployment, as well as overtime.
  Sector-level collective wage bargaining between trade unions and employers’ representatives
plays a major role in the wage formation process and concerns the vast majority of firms.2 Wage
setting in Belgium may be described as the outcome of three mechanisms. First, a prominent
feature of the Belgian labour market is full automatic indexation of nominal gross wages to the so-
called health index, which is the consumer price index excluding alcoholic beverages, tobacco and
motor fuels. This impedes real wage reductions of job stayers through the pace of inflation.
Second, the so-called wage norm, set at the national level, is a recommendation for a maximum
nominal hourly labour compensation increase. It is set by an interprofessional agreement for two
years and takes into account, among others, the predicted indexation and evolution of labour costs
of Belgium's  main trading partners (namely Germany, France and the Netherlands). Third, sector-
level agreements, typically organised separately for white-collar workers and blue-collar workers,
2   According to the Belgian WDN survey (Druant et al. (2008)), bargaining at sectoral level concern 98% of
all firms. This collective bargaining determine various aspects of compensation, such as pay scales and
real wage increases, as well as other aspects, such as training or mobility. Pay scales set a minimum
wage by sector and occupation and vary with age or tenure for white-collar workers and some blue-collar
workers. As a result of the EU's anti-discrimination rules, the relationship with age is less common today.5
specify real wage increases, which often consist of an absolute rise in the minimum pay scale. On
top of this, some companies have developed firm-level wage bargaining. These individual
agreements are not common in Belgium and typically lead to higher earnings.3 Note that union
representation and involvment within the firm is compulsory for companies employing 50 workers
or more, and they also have to have among others works councils.4 Union participation is stronger
and more structured in firms employing 100 and more people.5
  These features explain why Belgium has substantial real wage rigidity. However, it should be
noted that labour compensation involves extra-wage components such as bonuses, premiums and
overtime hours, which make total compensation more flexible than the base wage.
  Employment developments over the last decade have been characterised by changes in the
labour force composition. The trends include a smaller proportion of blue-collar workers in private
sector employment (from 54% in 1990 to 49% in 1997 and 46% in 2005 according to Social
Security statistics), an increasing fraction of part-time workers (accounting for 13.5% of
employment in 1990, 16.3% in 1997 and 18.1% in 2005 (OECD (2002, 2004, 2006)), fewer hours
worked per employee (the annual number of hours worked per employee fell from 1,546 in 1999 to
1,534 in 2005 (OECD (2004, 2006))) and a slightly higher number of employees with fixed-term
contracts. Fixed-term contracts represent only a small proportion of wage earners in Belgium, 6.3%
in 1997 and 8.8% in 2005, in comparison with EU average of 12% in 1997 and 14% in 2005
(Eurostat New Cronos).
Among the OECD member states, Belgium has a slightly higher level of employment
protection legislation than the OECD average. This results from below average protection of
regular employment and above average protection of temporary jobs and specific requirements for
collective dismissals (see OECD (2004)). On the other hand, flexibility of the labour market is
enhanced by early retirement and temporary unemployment. For firms in distress or in the process
of restructuring, early retirement is possible under specific conditions for workers aged 50 and over.
For short periods, temporary unemployment allows firms to temporarily interrupt, but not breach,
labour contracts. Workers then receive unemployment benefit for a defined period and are later re-
employed by the same firm under the initial contract terms. Together with changes in the number of
hours (e.g. due to overtime hours), temporary unemployment makes it possible to reduce the
number of hours worked, and avoid costly layoffs, as does early retirement.
3   From the Structure of Earnings Survey data for the years 1999 to 2005, in the manufacturing, construction
and business service sectors, 16% of companies have a firm-level agreement (either for blue-collar
workers, or for white-collar workers, or for both). Companies with firm-level collective wage agreement
tend to pay 15% higher wages than firms with no firm-level collective wage agreement. This figure rises to
20% if one includes irregular payments such as bonuses and premiums. In addition, the standard
deviation in individual earnings is 5% to 10% higher in companies with firm-level agreement, but the
coefficient of variation is 8% lower.
4   The works council is jointly composed of employees representatives and management staff. Its aim is to
provide a forum for consultation and negotiation between employers' and employees’ representatives.
5   In firms with a workforce of more than 100, employees’ representatives in the works council have to be
elected every four years; in smaller firms the representatives mandate is simply renewed.6
2.2 Data
The main variables of interest related to labour compensation (total wage bill, number of
employees, total hours worked) are taken from firms’ annual accounts. Almost all firms in Belgium
have to file their annual accounts with the Central Balance Sheet Office. However, we focus on the
manufacturing, construction and market services sectors, and we consider only firms with at least
50 employees. This accounts for 87% of total employment of our cleaned sample and represent the
vast majority of jobs. We prefer to disregard smaller firms because they may have different
employment dynamics.6 We perform a range of consistency checks to identify possible data issues
and exclude extreme observations as outliers. Technical details are discussed in Appendix A.1. In
our analysis, we estimate equations of employment, labour compensation, hours etc. by System
GMM. To make sure that sufficient history is available to build lagged instruments, we consider
only spells with at least 6 consecutive observations per firm and the variables in levels. Last, we
exclude sectors with either too few observations to estimate the production function, from which our
measure of TFP is derived, or sectors with production function coefficients substantially different
from the income shares. Altogether the data set contains  10.771 firm-year observations on 1.518
firms with more than 50 employees over the period 1997-2005. Table A1 in Appendix A provides
more details on the composition of the dataset across the sectors considered in the paper. Basic
descriptive statistics on the variables described below are given in Table A.2.
  The  real  wage  bill  of  firm i at time t is denoted as WBit and includes total remuneration and
direct social benefits deflated by sector-specific value added prices. Employment, abbreviated as
Lit, is measured as the average number of employees in full-time equivalent positions over the
year. Average labour compensation per firm (Wit) is simply calculated as the ratio of the total real
wage bill to the average number of employees over the year in full-time equivalent. Total hours
worked over the year for each firm are denoted as Hit. Value added per sector (VAst) was obtained
from national accounts statistics. Variables related to workforce composition, like the percentage of
blue-collar workers (%BLUEit), the percentage of women (%WOMENit) and the proportion of
workers with fixed-length contract (%TEMPit), are provided in the social balance sheet, which has
formed part of firms' annual accounts since 1996. This restricts the sample available to our study to
the period 1997-2005.7 The construction of capital stock (Kit) is based on the perpetual inventory
method (see Appendix A.2 for details). In what follows, variables in lower case designate log
transformation.
  We measure average labour compensation per firm as its total labour compensation divided by
the number of employees in full-time equivalent positions. This contrasts with empirical papers
based on individual wages (such as Cardoso and Portela (2005), Guiso et al. (2005)). These
studies focus on job stayers. Such analyses may underestimate the sensitivity of wages if the
6   For example, Kaiser and Pfeiffer (2001) find that in Germany employment flexibility is lower for smaller
firms, due to lesser use of recruitment dismissals, temporary employment contracts and overtime (short
time) work. Our own estimates, although not reported, indicate that the elasticity of labour to TFP is higher
for larger firms. This is also supported by the results of the WDN survey for Belgium (Druant et al. 2008).
7   We disregard the information for year 1996 due to data issues.7
wages of job stayers are less flexible than those of new hires, for example because they are
(partly) set by multi-period contracts. One advantage of our measure is that it also includes
employees whose wages might be more easily adjusted than permanent job stayers, such as new
entrants or workers on fixed-term contracts. Evidence that the wage of entrants or movers is more
flexible than that of job stayers is provided by Fehr and Goette (2005) and Haefke et al. (2008). A
potential disadvantage of our measure of average labour compensation is that it may vary with
changes in the composition of the labour force. We account for this by including control variables
related to workforce composition, namely the percentage of blue-collar workers, women, and
workers under fixed-term contracts, in our equations. Note also that our measure of average labour
compensation, i.e. the firm’s average labour compensation per employee, may be more flexible
than the base wage because it includes extra-wage components such as overtime hours, bonuses
and premiums. Because fluctuations in hours per worker, reported in the social accounts, imply
variations in labour compensation, that capture changes in compensation due to overtime hours or
temporary unemployment in addition to the reaction of the wage, we also estimate an equation for
hourly labour compensation defined as total labour compensation over total hours worked.
  We attempt to capture the impact of sector-level collective agreements on each firm's average
labour compensation. This is motivated by the considerable importance of sector-level collective
agreements in the wage-setting process in Belgium and our estimates confirm their relevance for
firms' average labour compensation. The variables are constructed as follows. The nominal index
of collectively agreed nominal wage increases at the sector-level for blue-collar workers and white-
collar workers, respectively, is published by the Ministry of Labour.8 We deflate these by the
corresponding sector-level value added deflator to obtain the real measure. We use the logarithm
of the real index of collectively agreed wage increases for blue-collar workers and white-collar
workers, I
B
st and I
W
st, respectively, and multiply these by the percentage of blue-collar workers and
white-collar workers for each firm. The measure is not perfect because collectively agreed wage
increases are set at a more detailed level (in terms of sectors, but also occupation and age or
tenure).9 Discrepancies with respect to the average labour compensation may capture the firm-
specific pay policy but also reflect the fact that collective agreements do not apply to more flexible
components of labour compensation which include bonuses, premiums and overtime hours paid.
Since the aim of the paper is to evaluate the response of labour compensation and
employment to TFP, it is crucial to construct unbiased and consistent measures of productivity and
avoid spurious correlation with labour. We estimate TFP through the method recently proposed by
Ackerberg et al. (2006), who improve on several grounds the estimation procedures used by Olley
and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). We take into account two important problems
8   Federal Public Service Employment Labour and Social Dialogue (FPS ELSD).
9   Note that collectively agreed nominal wage increases in Belgium are the result of two mechanisms:
indexation and collective agreements concerning real wage increases. We do not attempt to estimate the
latter, i.e. we do not try to discriminate between indexation and real wage increases negotiated within
sectoral collective agreements. Rather, we evaluate the impact on the firm's labour compensation of wage
increases triggered by the sector-level collective agreement that is decided outside the firm. From the
point of view of the company, these costs have to be compared to the firm's real output prices. Therefore,
we deflate the collectively agreed nominal wage increases by the value added deflator.8
related to measures of TFP based on the residual of a production function. The first is a
simultaneity bias arising from the fact that productivity shocks are likely to affect factor demand
(Ackerberg et al. (2006)). The second is that, in addition to their impact on the demand for factors,
productivity shocks may affect the rate of utilisation of production factors (Basu and Kimball
(1997)).
Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and Ackerberg et al. (2006) correct for
the simultaneity bias by augmenting the production function equation with a proxy of technological
shocks (based on capital and either investment or intermediate inputs). The procedures by Olley
and Pakes (1996) and Levinson and Petrin (2003) are based on a two-step estimation. In the first
step, the production function is estimated including the proxy for unobserved productivity to solve
the simultaneity problem. Because capital appears in the proxy for productivity and as a production
function factor, it is not identified. However, the equation provides an estimate of the labour
coefficient. In the second step, the coefficient on capital is estimated, given the first-step estimate
of the labour coefficient. The identification is based on the assumption that the current capital stock
was built in the previous period and is independent of current productivity innovations.
  Ackerberg et al. (2006) point out that when intermediate inputs are used to proxy unobserved
productivity, as in the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology, the labour production coefficient
cannot be identified in the first step if labour and intermediate inputs decisions are taken
simultaneously. The problem is similar but less severe when investment is used to proxy
unobserved productivity, as in Olley and Pakes (1996). Ackerberg et al. (2006) then propose an
alternative estimation procedure in which all production function parameters are estimated in the
second stage. Identification of the capital parameter is the same as in the Olley-Pakes and
Levinsohn-Petrin procedures. Identification of the labour parameter is achieved under the
assumption that lagged labour does not respond to current productivity shocks, contrary to current
labour.
  In this paper we adopt the Ackerberg et al. (2006) procedure. In addition, we correct the
obtained measure of TFP for variable capacity utilisation. In order to deal with this problem, Basu
and Kimball (1997) develop a structural model in which the rate of utilisation of labour can be
proxied by hours per worker. Furthermore, we decompose TFP into a firm-specific or idiosyncratic
TFP component, TFPit, and a sector-level or aggregate TFP component, TFPst. In short we regress
the Ackerberg et al. (2006) measure of TFP on hours per worker and a full set of interactive sector
and year dummies. The firm-level TFP corrected for variable utilisation rate, TFPit, is obtained as
the residual of this equation, and sector-level TFP, TFPst, as the estimated values of the sector-
specific time dummies. A thorough discussion, technical details and production function estimates
are included in Appendix A.3.
2.3 Specification
We adopt a dynamic specification. This is standard in employment equations due for instance to
adjustment costs (see Arellano and Bond (1991), Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999), Nickell and9
Wadhwani (1991)). In the labour compensation equations case, the inclusion of lags of the
endogenous variables may be motivated by multi-period contracts, wage smoothing, wage rigidity,
or reference norms, for example. Dynamic wage equations have been used by Katay (2007) for the
average wage bill per worker and by Guiso et al. (2005) for individual wages. In addition, from an
empirical point of view, omitting lags of endogenous variables lead to serially correlated residuals.
Equation (1) shows the baseline model that we estimate in Section 3:
 y it = U1yit-1 + U2 yit-2 + ȕ1tfpit + ȕ2tfpit-1 + ȕ3kit + ȕ4 BLUEit + ȕ5 TEMPit
  + ȕ 6  WOMENit + ȕ7 L>100it + Gi + Gst + İit               ( 1 )
Variables in lower case are measured in logs and ȕjs are the coefficients to be estimated. A vector
of dummy variables for the 14 sectors considered in the paper is denoted as Gs, year dummies as Gt
and interactive year and sector dummies as Gst. Firm fixed effects, Gi, capture unobserved firm
characteristics.
  In  equation  (1)  yit denotes the dependent variable, which can be any of the following variables:
average labour compensation (wit), employment (lit), hours (hit), hours per worker (h-lit), and hourly
labour compensation (wb-hit). Hence, we estimate dynamic equations for each component of the
wage bill and we also provide estimates for total hours worked and the wage bill per hour worked.
We include the same set of variables in all equations, which may therefore be viewed as reduced-
form equations. We allow for sector-specific year dummies to capture aggregate sector-level
conditions, such as aggregate demand or prices.
  We control for the composition of the labour force by including the percentage of blue-collar
workers, BLUEit, the percentage of women, WOMENit, and the percentage of workers with
fixed-term contracts, TEMPit. In order to take into account the impact of firm size in our
regressions, we include a dummy that is equal to one for firms with more than 100 employees,
"L>100it". This threshold is close to the median firm size in our sample. We favour this specification
over one that would directly include firm size for two reasons. First, including the number of
employees as a proxy for firm size would not be feasible in the employment equations for obvious
perfect colinearity reasons, and would generate complex endogeneity problems in equations for
average labour compensation. Second, the threshold can be motivated by the fact that union
participation may be considered as more structured in firms with 100 employees and more (see
section 2.1). Installed capital also enter the equation because it appears in labour demand
equations under various sets of theoretical assumptions.10
10  Assuming that firms are output constrained, employment depends on expected output and the relative
capital-labour ratio. If firms are not output constrained and the capital is pre-determined, then employment
depends on the pre-determined stock of capital and real wages.10
  In our alternative specification, the role of sector-specific variables is examined by replacing the
sector-specific time dummies, Gst, by a set of year dummies, Gt, sector dummies, Gs, and
sector-level variables. These include sector-level TFP, sector-specific value added,11 and weighted
indices of wage increases for blue-collar workers and white-collar workers determined by sector-
level collective agreements to capture the impact of sector-level collective agreement on firm'
average labour compensation:
 y it = U1yit-1 + U2 yit-2 + ȕ1tfpit + ȕ2tfpit-1 + ȕ3tfpst + ȕ4tfpst-1 + ȕ5kit + ȕ6vast
              + ȕ7 BLUEit + ȕ8 TEMPit + ȕ9 WOMENit + ȕ10 L>100it
  + ȕ 11 (%WHITEit * i
W
st) + ȕ12(%BLUEit * i
B
st) + Gi + Gs + Gt+ İit            ( 2 )
  Equations (1) and (2) include firm-specific fixed effects, as is common in the literature. This
implies that instrumental variables should be used to take into account endogeneity of the lagged
dependent variable. The dynamic panel equations are estimated by the System GMM procedure
proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). We report the two-step
estimates with standard errors corrected by the Windmeijer (2004) procedure. We assume that
TFP, firm size, labour force composition, sector-specific value added, and the impact of sector-level
collective agreements on firms' wages are exogenous. Lags of the endogenous variable, capital
stock and profits per worker are used as instruments.
  We assume that TFP is exogenous. One may nevertheless argue that it is endogenous. For
example, a demand shock might be correlated with our measure of TFP and with labour demand.
However, lags of TFP, intermediate inputs and capital stock proved to be very poor instruments
effectively making the TFP coefficient insignificant.12 Therefore, we favour our specification that
assumes TFP exogenous, although we are aware that TFP might be endogenous and reflect
demand or factor price shocks together with productivity.
  Note also that we do not take into account at this stage the fact that TFP is a generated
regressor. Because of the uncertainty surrounding the estimates of production function coefficients
used to construct TFP series, the standard errors of TFP reported in the tables below may be
considered as a lower bound.13
11   Unemployment is often used as a determinant of wages. Because unemployment rates are not available
at the sector level, we use a proxy for sector-level business conditions. Labour demand also depends on
the sector output price (or sector demand) under monopolistic competition conditions. For both reasons
we include the log of sector value added in equation (2).
12  A least squares regression of changes in TFP on lags 4 and 5 of TFP, intermediate inputs and capital
stock yield a R² of only 0.01. Consequently when estimating average labour compensation and labour
equations by SGMM with TFP considered as endogenous, the TFP coefficient becomes insignificant.
Results are available on request.
13  We expect that estimating standard errors by bootstrap will not change our conclusions. The estimated
effect of firm-specific TFP on labour compensation may turn insignificant (as is already the case in Table
1 below). But it is unlikely that the coefficients of sector-level TFP in the labour compensation equations,
and those of firm-specific and sector-level TFP in the labour equations become insignificant because this
would imply that the bootstrap standard errors are 3 times larger (or more) than the standard errors
reported in the text.11
3. Results
3.1 Estimating the elasticity of average labour compensation and labour to firm-specific TFP
In this section we compare the elasticity of labour compensation and labour to firm-specific TFP.
We estimate equation (1) for average labour compensation, employment, hours worked, hourly
labour compensation, as well as hours per worker. The results are reported in Table 1. The
coefficients on control variables have the expected sign. Firms with a higher percentage of blue-
collar workers and women have significantly lower average labour compensation, all else equal.
Also, firms with a higher percentage of workers under fixed-term contracts have ceteris paribus
lower average labour compensation. The capital stock has a positive coefficient in the employment
equation, suggesting complementarities between the two production factors, capital and labour.
  Our estimates indicate that the contemporaneous elasticity of average labour compensation to
TFP is not significantly different from zero, while the elasticity of employment is large, 0.23. The
sum of the coefficients on current and lagged TFP is 0.03 for average labour compensation and
hourly labour compensation, which is four times smaller than the sum for employment (0.11) and
total hours (0.10).
  The elasticity of total hours worked, which accounts both for changes in hours per worker and
changes in the number of employees, is of the same order of magnitude as that of employment. In
the presence of adjustment costs in the short run, firms may adjust hours worked more easily than
the number of employees, for example through overtime hours and temporary unemployment.14
However, adjustment of hours per worker is very rare. Indeed, the contemporaneous elasticity of
hours per worker to TFP is not significantly different from zero. This means that firms adjust labour
to firm-specific productivity developments mainly through the extensive margin, rather than the
intensive margin.
  These results are consistent with the survey evidence in Druant et al. (2008). This indicates
that, when reducing costs following an adverse shock, 60% of Belgian firms declare that they
reduce employment, while only 14% of the companies adjust pay (and only do so through the
variable components), while a very small proportion of enterprises actually reduce working time.15
Note that comparing the very low elasticity of average labour compensation to the substantial
elasticity of labour to firm-level TFP supports the hypothesis of real wage rigidity in Belgium. In
general, models with wage rigidity typically find wider variability of employment in response to
productivity shock, as compared to the flexible wage scenario (see for example Hall (2005) and
Blanchard and Galí (2007, 2008)) so that labour productivity can match the real wage. However,
our estimates do not provide a test or a measure of real wage rigidity. There is no theoretical
reference value for the average labour compensation elasticity and labour elasticity under the
14  See Fuss (2008) for evidence that variations in hours per worker and the number of days worked are
significantly lower in cases of falling sales and wage bill contractions.
15   For comparison, Bertola et al. (2008) report that on average over 15 European countries, around 30% of
firms declare that they reduce employment, 11% of the firms reduce pay, and up to 7% cut working time.12
flexible wage case. In the model of Blanchard and Galí (2008) without labour market frictions,
labour does not respond to TFP under perfect wage and price flexibility. But this results from the
fact that, in their model, income and substitution effects cancel each other out.
  Our estimates of the elasticity of average labour compensation to TFP are partly related to the
investigation of wage insurance. Following Guiso et al. (2005) for Italy, a number of authors
decompose the sensitivity of wages to productivity into that due to permanent productivity changes
and the other due to transitory productivity changes (see Cardoso and Portela (2005) for Portugal
and Katay (2007) for Hungary). We estimate the average effect of TFP, while these papers go one
step further by decomposing the average effect into the permanent and transitory part.16 A zero
response of wages to transitory changes in productivity is interpreted as evidence that risk-neutral
firms insure risk-averse workers against wage fluctuations because wage insurance may apply to
transitory but not to permanent shocks. Our finding of a zero elasticity of average labour
compensation a fortiori suggests that permanent (if any) and transitory idiosyncratic TFP changes
are insured. This interpretation translates into firm average wages provided that we appropriately
control for changes in the composition of the labour force. Further, our estimates of the elasticity of
labour is consistent with the following interpretation. In a contract model where firms insure workers
against income fluctuations, Boldrin and Horvath (1995) show that the response of wages to
shocks is smoother, and the volatility of hours worked is higher than in a situation without wage
insurance.
  Lastly, the low response of firms' wages to firm-specific shocks may be explained by labour
market competition, efficiency wage considerations and product market competition. For example,
in a tight labour market it may not be desirable for a company to reduce wages following a negative
productivity shock, because it makes other companies more attractive for its workers. Further, this
may generate adverse selection problems. This argument would explain why the firms' average
labour compensation response to firm-level shocks is low, after controlling for workforce
composition. Further, in a competitive product market, firms are price-taker and may not afford
wage increases because they will not be able to raise their prices if their competitors do not.
16   We do not attempt to decompose the effect of TFP into transitory and permanent effects because in our
case the average (over permanent and transitory) effect is zero.13
Table 1 - SGMM estimates of equation (1)
wit lit hit wb-hit h-lit
dep. varit-1  0.70***  1.17***  1.07***  0.63***  0.28**
(0.11) (0.13) (0.15) (0.09) (0.12)
dep. varit-2  0.09 -0.28** -0.18  0.24***  0.41***
(0.09) (0.12) (0.13) (0.08) (0.08)
tfpit  0.02  0.23***  0.18***  0.03* -0.01
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
tfpit-1  0.01 -0.12*** -0.08***  0.00  0.01
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
kit  0.01  0.02***  0.02***  0.00  0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
%BLUEit -0.15***  0.03**  0.01 -0.08*** -0.04***
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
%TEMPit -0.07***  0.27***  0.27*** -0.07***  0.06**
(0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03)
%WOMENit -0.08**  0.03*  0.01 -0.03 -0.04***
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
L>100it -0.01  0.09***  0.09***  0.00  0.00
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
Sargan 84.62 78.04 76.33 56.71 64.69
  p-value (0.02) (0.05) (0.06) (0.56) (0.29)
AR(1) -4.59 -4.66 -3.71 -3.95 -2.08
  p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04)
AR(2)  0.20 -0.41 -0.20 -1.49 -4.15
  p-value (0.85) (0.68) (0.84) (0.14) (0.00)
Note: Firms with at least 50 employees and 6 consecutive annual accounts. 1.518 firms and 6.217 observations.
Two-step System GMM estimates are reported with standard errors in parentheses following the correction
proposed by Windmeijer (2004). The lagged dependent variable (denoted as dep. varit-1) and the capital stock
are treated as endogenous and instrumented with the Arellano-Bond instrument matrix with lags t-4 and
earlier, as well as profit per worker. The remaining regressors are treated as exogenous. All equations include
interactive sector and year dummies but their coefficients are not reported. AR displays the test for serial
correlation in the first-differenced residuals. Lower case variables are in log. The remaining variables are
defined in the text. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level.
  These arguments may explain why the sensitivity of average labour compensation to TFP is
low. But it does not explain differences across countries,17 unless there are large differences in the
degree of wage insurance, wage rigidity, or competition on the labour market. Compared to
previous estimates, Belgium has the lowest elasticity of average labour compensation to TFP. In
contrast, there is evidence of insurance against transitory shocks in Italy and Portugal, but the
response to permanant shock is above zero. In the case of Hungary, the response of wages to
17  Although previous microeconomic estimates are not fully comparable due to different approaches, data
and sample definitions, they still provide a basis for comparison. Below, we consider the main differences
with the results of Guiso et al. (2005), Cardoso and Portela (2005) and Katay (2007). First, Guiso et al.
(2005) focus only on the manufacturing sector. Our own preliminary estimates indicate that the elasticity
of wages to productivity is lower when services are included in the sample. Second, papers based on
individual wage data restrict their sample to job stayers. However Fehr and Goette (2005) and Haefke et
al. (2007) report that entrants' wages are more flexible than incumbents' wages. Hence, focusing on job
stayers may bias the estimated elasticity downwards. Third, considering earnings per worker or hourly
earnings may yield different results when hours per worker are adjusted to changes in productivity.14
productivity is the highest but also there is no evidence of full insurance against temporary
fluctuations in productivity.18
There are several reasons for differences between the results for Hungary and other Western
European countries (see Katay (2007)). Among others, according to the OECD (2004), Hungary is
among the countries with the most flexible labour market. Company and plant-level agreements are
the dominant form of wage bargaining, with no coordination by upper-level associations and no
centralisation. Further, the coverage of collective agreements is very low.19 Therefore, firms have
more freedom to change wages in response to TFP shocks. In contrast, sector-level agreements
are common in the remaining European countries, combined with firm-level agreements (in France
and Italy), or central agreements (in Portugal and Belgium), and a medium or high defree of
coordination with high coverage of collective agreements.
Our results may be summarised as follows. First, labour has substantially high elasticity to firm-
specific TFP; while conversely average labour compensation are insensitive to idiosyncratic TFP.20
Although the elasticity of labour under perfect wage and price flexibility has no natural reference
value, this finding is consistent with significant real wage rigidity in Belgium that shifts the burden of
adjustment towards employment. It is also consistent with the importance of sector-level collective
agreements in the wage formation process, as will be discussed below. Second, following a TFP
change, firms adjust labour mainly on the extensive margin. Third, our estimates point to a positive
relation between hours and TFP. The following two subsections examine in more detail whether the
finding translates into sector-level TFP, the role of collective wage agreements in shaping the
response of average labour compensation, and also discuss our finding of a positive elasticity of
hours to TFP.
3.2. Differences in the elasticity to firm-specific TFP and sector-level TFP
  Here we compare the response of labour compensation and labour to firm-specific TFP and to
sector-level TFP. While the previous section highlights a close-to-zero and non-significant
response of average labour compensation to firm-specific TFP, the same may not hold with respect
to sector-level TFP. First, one of the reasons not to adjust wages downwards is the fear that the
best workers leave for better-paying companies. In the Belgian WDN survey by Druant et al.
(2008), more than 80% of firms with more than 50 employees report that this is a motive not to cut
wages. However, the argument does not hold when all firms undertake wage contractions at the
same time, as opposed to a single company doing so unilaterally. Also, if competition on the
product market is strong, i.e. if markups are small or if firms are price takers, they cannot undertake
18  The estimated permanent effect of productivity is 0.11 for Hungary against 0.07 for Italy and 0.09 for
Portugal. The estimated transitory effect of productivity is 0.05 for Hungary and not significant in other
countries.
19   According to Traxler and Behrens (2002), the percentage of employees covered by collective agreements
(i.e. including not only union members but also other employees to whom the union-negotiated contract
applies) is around 90% in Belgium, France, Italy and Portugal and 36% in Hungary (data for 2001).
20   As shown in Section 4, this result is robust to alternative definitions of TFP (controlling or not for variable
utilisation rate and considering TFP shocks rather than TFP in level).15
isolated wage increases because they cannot raise their prices without incurring losses unless their
competitors follow the suit. Lastly, it has been argued that centralisation of wage bargaining may
ease wage contraction (see Bruno and Sachs (1985)), thanks to coordination of decisions and
internalisation of the externalities of individual actions. We examine this last issue in the next sub-
section.
  Estimates including firm-level as well as sector-level TFP are reported in Table 2 below. We
therefore estimate equation (2) with additive year and sector dummies, instead of sector-specific
year effects. To account for other fluctuations at the sector level we also include value added per
sector.
Table 2 - SGMM estimates of equation (2)
wit lit hit whit h/Lit
dep. varit-1  0.84***  1.32***  1.09***  0.90***  0.33***
(0.12) (0.13) (0.15) (0.16) (0.12)
dep. varit-2 -0.07 -0.43*** -0.19  0.00  0.40***
(0.09) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.07)
tfpit  0.03**  0.23***  0.18***  0.04*** -0.01
(0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01)
tfpit-1  0.00 -0.13*** -0.09*** -0.02  0.01
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
tfpst  0.54***  0.13***  0.17***  0.49***  0.05**
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02)
tfpst-1 -0.30*** -0.06 -0.10** -0.27*** -0.06**
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.03)
kit  0.00  0.02**  0.02***  0.00  0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
yst -0.12***  0.01  0.02 -0.07*  0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
%BLUEit -0.16***  0.02**  0.01 -0.06** -0.04***
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
%TEMPit -0.08***  0.29***  0.25*** -0.06***  0.05*
(0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03)
%WOMENit -0.09**  0.03*  0.01 -0.02 -0.03***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
L>100it -0.01  0.09***  0.08***  0.00  0.00
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
Sargan 98.62 82.26 76.22 70.84 58.48
p-value (0.00) (0.02) (0.07) (0.14) (0.50)
AR(1) -5.29 -5.39 -3.72 -3.54 -2.13
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03)
AR(2)  2.07  0.25 -0.24  0.87 -4.10
p-value (0.04) (0.80) (0.81) (0.39) (0.00)
Note: Firms with at least 50 employees and 6 consecutive annual accounts. 1.518 firms and 6.217 observations.
Two-step System GMM estimates are reported with standard errors in parentheses following the correction
proposed by Windmeijer (2004). The lagged dependent variable (denoted as dep. varit-1) and the capital stock
are treated as endogenous and instrumented with the Arellano-Bond instrument matrix with lags t-4 and
earlier, as well as profit per worker. The remaining regressors are treated as exogenous. All equations include
additive sector and year dummies but their coefficients are not reported. AR displays the test for serial
correlation in the first-differenced residuals. Lower case variables are in log. The remaining variables are
defined in the text. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level.
  The most striking result is that the elasticity of average labour compensation to sector-level
TFP is very large compared to that with respect to firm-specific TFP. The sum of the coefficients on16
current and lagged sector-level TFP for labour compensation is much larger (0.22 to 0.24) than that
for firm-specific TFP (0.02 to 0.03). This holds for both unit or hourly labour compensation. By
contrast, the sum of the coefficients on current and lagged aggregate TFP for the number of
employees and hours worked equations is slightly smaller (0.07) than that for idiosyncratic TFP
(0.09 to 0.10).
  The picture that emerges from these results is one of sluggish average labour compensation
and large employment fluctuations in response to idiosyncratic TFP but more flexible average
labour compensation and less sensitive labour in response to aggregate fluctuations. One
interpretation of these results is that firms in Belgium are bound by sector-level collective wage
agreements and tend not to deviate too much from them. This hypotheses is examined in the next
section.
3.3. The role of sector-level collective wage bargaining
Collective bargaining plays a dominant role for wage-setting in Belgium. First, an indicative norm
for maximum nominal hourly labour cost increases is set at the national level. Then, given expected
indexation, sector-level agreements decide on real increases of the base wages or minimum pay
scale. In order to illustrate the role of sector-level collective bargaining in shaping the response of
average labour compensation to TFP, Table 3 below reports three sets of estimates for average
labour compensation. Column (1) is directly taken from Table 2. Column (2) includes the impact of
sector-level collective wage agreements on firms' average labour compensation, but omits sector-
level TFP (we do not include the two together for colinearity reasons explained below).
  The impact of sector-level collectively agreed wage increases at the firm level is positive and
significant. The point estimates imply that a one percent increase in the collectively agreed wage
induces firms to raise average labour compensation on average by 0.65 and 0.68 percent for blue-
collar and white-collar workers, respectively. Note that once sector-specific time dummies are
allowed for (column (3)), the coefficients for sector-level collectively agreed wage increase,
%WHITEit.i
W
st  and %BLUEit.i
B
st, become smaller and insignificant. This suggests that the impact of
sector-level bargaining on firms’ average labour compensation (%WHITEit.i
W
st  and %BLUEit.i
B
st) is
driven mostly by sector-level agreements, i
W
st a n d  i
B
st, rather than by the firm workforce
composition.21
21 The result is driven by the fact that wage increases set by sector-level collective agreement follow the
same trend for blue-collar and white-collar workers from the same sector but different patterns across
sectors.17
Table 3 - SGMM estimates of equation (2) for average labour compensation
(1) (2) (3)
wit-1  0.84***  0.70***  0.61***
(0.12) (0.18) (0.18)
wit-2 -0.07  0.15  0.21
(0.09) (0.15) (0.15)
tfpit  0.03**  0.02  0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
tfpit-1  0.00  0.00  0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
tfpst  0.54***
(0.04)
tfpst-1 -0.30***
(0.06)
%WHITEit.i
W
st  0.68*** -0.81
(0.12) (0.59)
%BLUEit.i
B
st  0.65*** -0.80
(0.09) (0.59)
kit  0.00  0.00  0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
yst -0.12*** -0.09
(0.04) (0.06)
%BLUEit -0.16*** -0.12** -0.11**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
%TEMPit -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.09***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
%WOMENit -0.09** -0.04 -0.04
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
L>100it -0.01  0.00  0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
year and sector
dummies Gs and Gt Gs and Gt

Gst
Sargan 98.62  51.26 54.39
p-value (0.00) (0.11) (0.06)
AR(1) -5.29 -2.87 -2.51
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
AR(2)  2.07 -0.22 -0.64
p-value (0.04) (0.83) (0.52)
Note: Firms with at least 50 employees and 6 consecutive annual accounts. 1.518 firms and 6.217 observations.
Two-step System GMM estimates are reported with standard errors in parentheses following the correction
proposed by Windmeijer (2004). The lagged dependent variable (denoted as dep. varit-1) and the capital stock
are treated as endogenous and instrumented with the Arellano-Bond instrument matrix with lags t-4 and
earlier, as well as profit per worker. The remaining regressors are treated as exogenous. All equations include
additive sector and year dummies but their coefficients are not reported. AR displays the test for serial
correlation in the first-differenced residuals. Lower case variables are in log. The remaining variables are
defined in the text. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level.
  We then perform a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation of the impact of TFP through
sector-level collective agreements. OLS regressions of changes in the log of the indices of sector-
level collectively agreed wage increases (deflated by value-added prices) on changes in sector-
level TFP per sector confirm that there is a highly significant and positive relationship between TFP
and collective wage increases at the sector level - the coefficient is equal to 0.38 for white-collar
workers and 0.39 for blue-collar workers. This confirms the conjecture that productivity
developments are taken into account in wage-setting practice in Belgium. Importantly, this
suggests that the impact of TFP on average labour compensation is not zero, but labour18
compensation in Belgium adjusts mainly through collectively agreed wage increases, which take
into account sector-level common productivity evolutions rather than idiosyncratic or firm-specific
TFP changes. A simple calculation suggests that the impact of sector-level TFP on firm-level
average real labour compensation per worker is 0.26.22 This is close to the sum of the coefficient
on sector-level TFP in column (1), 0.24. For the sake of comparison, in a structural VAR model for
the US, Ravn and Simonelli (2007) find that the impact of neutral technology shocks on real wages
is 0.15 after a year. The estimates of the elasticity of wages aggregated over all workers to labour
productivity for the US over the period 1984-2006 obtained by Haefke et al. (2007) range from 0.17
to 0.37.
  All in all, our results point to the fact that firms have little room for adjusting their average labour
compensation to firm-specific developments but respond to sector-level TFP via sector-level
collective bargaining. Firms may not deviate too far from sector-level collective agreements for
workers already employed by the firm, i.e. job stayers. In addition, bonuses and premiums
generally do not account for a substantial proportion of earnings in Belgium.23 Lastly, one might
argue that firms could adjust their average wage bill by applying a different pay scheme to entrants
and workers under fixed-term contracts. However, the percentage of workers under fixed-term
contracts in Belgium is below the average for Europe (see Section 2.1). In addition, minimum pay
scale defined at the activity, occupation and tenure level, within sector-level collective agreements,
provide a lower bound for new entrants' wages.
3.4 The hours-TFP relationship
After having examined the sensitivity of average labour compensation to TFP we now turn to
the hours-TFP relationship. In the macroeconomic literature, there is some controversy about the
sign of the relationship between hours and technology. Few papers investigate this issue at the
microeconomic level. In this section, we first review the macroeconomic debate, then we describe
previous microeconomic estimates. We then go on to discuss the differences between
macroeconomic and microeconomic estimates. Lastly, we report our own estimates of the elasticity
of hours with respect to TFP and compare with other microeconomic evidence.
As mentioned in the introduction, under monopolistic competition conditions in the product
market, the short-run response of hours to technology shocks should be positive when prices are
flexible, and negative in the case of sticky prices. Additional explanations for a negative relationship
between hours and technology shocks include a short-run negative effect on production due to
22   This is obtained as follows. Differentiating equation (2) for average labour compensation as a dependent
variable with respect to the index of collectively agreed wage increases for blue-collar and white-collar
workers leads to ¨wit = ȕ11 %WHITEit * ¨i
W
st + ȕ12 %BLUEit * ¨i
B
st. An OLS regression of ¨i
W
st (¨i
B
st) on
¨tfpst yields a coefficient of 0.38 for white-collar workers and 0.39 for blue-collar workers. Therefore, given
the average percentage of blue-collar workers in our sample (0.38) and the coefficient estimates in Table
2, the impact of tfpst on firm-level wages is equal to 0.26.
23  Data from the Belgian Structure of Earnings Survey (SES) indicates that bonuses form on average 8.4
percent of earnings. The proportion varies from 2.4 percent in hotels and restaurants to 13.3 percent in
financial services.19
adaptation to the new technology, habit formation in consumption and adjustment costs in
investment.
  The macroeconomic empirical evidence is not conclusive. Starting with Galí (1999), a number
of structural VAR analyses point to a negative short-run impact of neutral technology shocks on
hours worked. Francis and Ramey (2005) find that this result is robust to alternative VAR
specifications and identification schemes. Smets and Wouters (2007) confirm this finding in a
DSGE model with price and nominal wage stickiness. Basu at al. (2006) find that their growth
accounting measure of technology has a negative impact on hours within the quarter, but a positive
effect after one year. Using both VAR and growth accounting measures of technological change,
Alexius and Carlsson (2007) find that technology shocks are positively correlated with output
growth and negatively correlated with changes in hours worked. Galí's finding has been challenged
on several grounds. It has been argued that the effect of productivity on hours turns positive if one
assumes that hours are stationary rather than difference stationary (Christiano et al. (2003, 2004)),
if one allows for an investment-specific technology shock (Ravn and Simonelli (2007)), or if one
allows shocks other than technology changes to have a long-run effect on labour productivity
(Dedola and Neri (2007)).
Few recent papers evaluate this question at the microeconomic level. Based on firm-level data,
Marchetti and Nucci (2005, 2007) and Carlsson and Smedsaas (2007) evaluate the impact of
growth accounting productivity measures on total hours worked. These papers suggest that current
TFP shock has a negative impact on hours, although the effect of past TFP is positive and
compensates for the initial negative effect. The main finding of Marchetti and Nucci (2005, 2007) is
that the effect of a TFP shock on hours within the year is more negative for firms with stickier
prices.
Note that there are several reasons why the elasticity might differ when macroeconomic
productivity is considered. First, microeconomic exercises typically evaluate the impact of
idiosyncratic productivity shocks, while macroeconomic or sector-level analyses consider the
response to a common aggregate change. A new secret recipe or a patented innovation can serve
as examples of idiosyncratic productivity shocks. The innovating firm will then have a productivity
advantage over its competitors. The introduction of new software by Microsoft would be a common
productivity shock. In principle all firms have access to this technological improvement. Firms might
react differently to idiosyncratic and common shocks. An individual firm might have different
incentives and varying ability to change its price when it is the only one facing the shock than if the
shock is common to all firms.
Second, macroeconomic investigations rely on structural estimations of technology shocks,
typically assumed to have long-run impact on output, while microeconomic studies rely on TFP
growth accounting measures. One traditional caveat of these measures is that nominal variables
are deflated using sector-level price indices rather than firm-level output prices, due to the lack of
relevant data. As shown in Klette and Griliches (1996), this may bias the production function
coefficient estimates. Further, TFP measures may capture demand shocks (Foster et al., 2008) or
variation in factor prices (Katayama et al., 2003), together with technological changes. Demand20
shocks will induce a positive correlation between TFP and hours which is not related to
technological change and may not be present in macroeconomic models.
Lastly, macroeconomic series of hours cannot be directly compared to the microeconomic data
due to different weights and composition. Firstly, in panel data all firms have the same weight,
while in a macroeconomic series firms are implicitly weighted by their size. Secondly, the sample
composition may be different. Using aggregate productivity decompositions of the type developed
by Baily et al. (1992) and Foster et al. (2001), several authors have found evidence that aggregate
productivity fluctuations are due not only to productivity developments of continuing firms, but also
to a substantial extent to reallocation of workers across establishments, including entries and exits
of plants or firms. Following a positive common TFP shock, some companies may immediately
invest in the new technology, increase output and total hours and expand their market share at the
expense of some other enterprises that might be driven out of the market. In such cases, hours
worked in these firms will of course drop. What is observed in our panel dataset are only surviving
firms (with 50 and more employees, six consecutive years and active over the entire calendar
year). On the contrary, macroeconomic series aggregate hours across all firms. This may drive the
response of aggregate hours towards more negative values.
The debate on the sign of the hours-technology relationship focuses on the short-run response
of hours. In the medium run, for example once prices adjust, hours increase following a productivity
shock. With the above caveats in mind, note that our estimate of the within-the-year response of
hours to aggregate sector-level TFP reported in Table 2 is positive.
Comparing our estimates of idiosyncratic elasticity to previous microeconomic studies, one
important difference between our results and Marchetti and Nucci (2005, 2007) and Carlsson and
Smedsaas (2007) is their finding that the effect of current TFP shocks on hours is negative, while
our results point to a positive contemporaneous effect.
Several factors may explain the difference in the estimated sign of the hours-technology
relationship. We first examine differences due to methodology or data issues. First, we consider the
level of TFP, while Marchetti and Nucci (2005, 2007) consider TFP shocks estimated from an
AR(2) regression on TFP. Replacing TFP level by AR(2) shocks leaves the estimated elasticity
essentially unchanged, as shown in the robustness tests in part (2) of Table 4 in Section 4.
  Second, the TFP measure used by Marchetti and Nucci (2005, 2007) and Carlsson and
Smedsaas (2007) takes into account variable utilisation of production factors which can be
approximated by hours per worker, following the structural approach of Basu and Kimball (1997).
We adopt a more empirical approach and simply regress the Ackerberg et al. (2006) TFP measure
of hours per worker to clean TFP for variable utilisation rate. When considering a TFP measure not
corrected for hours per worker, we still obtain a positive elasticity with respect to TFP (see part (3)21
of Table 4 in Section 4). And the results in Marchetti and Nucci (2007) using Olley and Pakes'
estimation procedure that also neglects variable utilisation still lead to a negative contemporaneous
effect of TFP on hours.24
Third, we also examine potential omitted variable bias. The above-mentioned papers only
include year and sector dummies as control variables. If we include only two lags of hours, current
and lagged TFP in the hours equation with interactive or additive year and sector dummies, the
coefficient on current TFP changes is smaller (equal to 0.10) but remains significant. The same
result applies when estimating the hours equation with no lags of hours by OLS in difference.
Fourth, the difference in the results may be due to the measurement of labour. Carlsson and
Smedsaas (2007) find a negative impact of TFP on average employment but a zero impact on
employment measured at the end of the year. This is consistent with the result in Basu et al. (2006)
that, following a TFP shock, hours diminish within the quarter but increase after a year. These
results indicate that the probability of finding a negative relationship is lower when using annual
data. Note that in our estimation, we consider the average employment over the year, so the
argument does not apply.
  All in all, we consider our finding that the response of hours to TFP is positive within the year to
be robust. Below, we examine whether the different results can be due to differences across the
countries. As already discussed above, real wage rigidity shifts the burden of adjustment towards
labour following a productivity shock, so that labour productivity can match the real wage. On the
other hand, sticky-price models, such as Galí's (1999), imply that hours respond negatively to TFP
shocks because demand and therefore output remain constant under unchanged prices. In sum
real wage rigidity tends to produce a positive relationship between labour and productivity, while
price stickiness goes in the opposite direction. It is nevertheless not clear how this could alter the
sign of the labour-technology relationship, given the evidence of both wage and price rigidity.
  Firstly, Belgium would have to have much more flexible prices than Italy in order to explain the
difference in the sign and size of the hours-technology relationship between our results and those
of Marchetti and Nucci (2005, 2007). However, the recent findings of the Inflation Persistence
Network summarised by Dhyne et al. (2006) report an average (weighted) frequency of consumer
price changes equal to 0.15 for Belgium and 0.12 for Italy.25 It is hard to believe that this alone can
explain the difference in the sign of the hours-technology relationship between our estimates and
those of Marchetti and Nucci (2005, 2007).
  Secondly, our estimates support the hypothesis of real wage rigidity in Belgium. Our results
point to a very small (and hardly significant) response of average labour compensation in Belgium,
while the response of individual wages in Italy is not significantly different from zero in response to
24   Note also that the Olley and Pakes (1996) methodology is closer to that used in this paper than Basu and
Kimball's (1997) approach, in the sense that production function coefficients are estimated neglecting
fixed effects. In the Basu and Kimball (1997) methodology, they are estimated by GMM, thus allowing for
fixed effects.
25  Vermeulen et al. (2007) report a higher average (weighted) frequency of producer price changes for
Belgium (0.24) than for Italy (0.15). However, part of the lower frequency in Italy can be explained by the
absence of energy products that typically have the highest frequency of price changes. In general, one
finds stronger heterogeneity in price adjustment across sectors than across countries.22
transitory productivity shocks, but amounts to 0.07 in response to permanent productivity shocks.
  In sum, this section present robust evidence that at the firm-level hours respond positively to
TFP. To judge whether this conclusion translates to macroeconomic aggregates would require a
different exercise.
4. Robustness tests
Our base measure of TFP is obtained as the firm-specific component of the production function
residual with production function coefficients estimated according to the Ackerberg et al. (2006)
methodology (see Appendix A.3) and regressed on hours per worker to control for variable
utilisation of production factors. We continue to focus on firm-level response to firm-level
productivity developments corrected for hours per worker. Results from Table 1 are reported in the
first section of Table 4.
  First, we consider TFP shocks instead of the level of TFP. Indeed, the estimated coefficient on
the level of TFP may be a mix of the dynamic response to current and lagged TFP shocks.
Following Marchetti and Nucci (2005, 2007), we construct the shocks as the residuals from an
AR(2) model on TFP with sector-specific intercept and slopes. The estimates of the current
elasticity to TFP hardly change but the lagged impact is now positive.
Table 4 - SGMM estimates - alternative definitions of TFP
wit lit hit wb-hit h-lit
(1) TFP corrected for hours per worker (as in Table 1)
tfpit  0.02  0.23***  0.18***  0.03* -0.01
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
tfpit-1  0.01 -0.12*** -0.08***  0.00  0.01
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
(2) AR(2) TFP shock corrected for hours per worker
tfpit  0.03  0.25***  0.23***  0.01  0.00
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01)
tfpit-1 -0.00  0.12***  0.13*** -0.01 -0.00
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
(3) TFP not corrected for hours per worker
tfpit  0.06***  0.25***  0.24***  0.01  0.02*
(0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
tfpit-1 -0.03 -0.11*** -0.13*** -0.00 -0.02*
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
(4) AR(2) shock on TFP not corrected for hours per worker
tfpit  0.04*  0.24***  0.24***  0.00  0.02
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
tfpit-1 -0.00  0.12***  0.13*** -0.01  0.01
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
Notes: The table presents only results for current and lagged TFP. In addition, each equation includes in
addition the same control variables as Table 1. For details on GMM estimation, see note under Table 1.
Standard errors in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1%
level.
  Second, we examine the Ackerberg et al. (2006) estimate of TFP that is not corrected for
variation in hours per worker, as is the case for Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin23
(2003) measures. As discussed above, our measure of average labour compensation, i.e. firm
wage bill per employee in full time equivalent employee, includes compensation for overtime hours.
Therefore, using a measure of TFP that does not take into account variable utilisation may induce a
spurious positive correlation with our measure of wage and hours. The results in Table 4 suggest
that such an upward bias may indeed be present. The coefficient on TFP in the average labour
compensation equation increases and turns significant. In addition, the elasticity of hours per
workers is significantly positive, although of a small magnitude.
  Lastly, for comparison with the results in Marchetti and Nucci (2005) based on the Olley and
Pakes (1996) methodology, we report estimates based on the shocks to TFP not corrected for
variable utilisation rate in part (4) of Table 4.
5. Conclusion
  In this paper we estimate the sensitivity of average labour compensation, employment, hours,
hourly labour compensation and hours worked per employee to firm-specific and sector-level Total
Factor Productivity. The sign and size of these elasticities may be affected by the presence of
wage rigidity, employment adjustment costs, as well as price stickiness. On the one hand, real
wage rigidity reduces the sensitivity of wages to shocks and shifts the burden of adjustment
towards labour (Boldrin and Horvath (1995), Hall (2005)). On the other hand, hiring and firing costs
may restrict adjustment through employment. In addition, price stickiness may induce a negative
response of hours worked to productivity changes in the short or medium-run (see, for instance,
Gali (1999)).
  We compare the response of average labour compensation and labour to firm-level TFP with
the response to sector-level TFP. When firms compete for workers on the labour market, they may
implicitly coordinate their pay policies and refrain from isolated wage adjustment. When they
compete on the product market they may not be able to transfer wage increases to prices. Lastly, it
has been argued that collective wage bargaining may ease wage adjustment, especially in adverse
times. Given the prominent role of sector-level wage bargaining in Belgium, this argument would
again translate into a larger elasticity of average labour compensation with respect to sector-level
TFP than with respect to firm-specific TFP.
  We rely on a dataset obtained from firms' annual accounts and social balance sheets in
Belgium over the period 1997-2005. Belgium is typically pointed out as a country with substantial
real wage rigidity, due in part to its system of full automatic indexation of base wages. In addition,
wage developments are largely driven by sector-level collective wage agreements. This makes
Belgium a relevant case to study the role of real wage rigidity in alternative adjustment margins,
and the role of centralised collective agreements in wage dynamics.
  Our models are dynamic regression equations for each of the variables mentioned above and
including TFP, variables that control for the workforce composition, capital stock, a firm size
dummy and proxies of sector-level conditions. Our results can be summarised as follows. Focusing
on the response to firm-level TFP, our estimates of the elasticity of  average labour compensation24
to TFP is close to zero, while the elasticity of labour is high. Even though studies for other
European countries surveyed in the paper also find low elasticity of wages to firm-level productivity,
our estimate for Belgium is amongst the lowest. Although our analysis does not provide a test or
evaluation of the extent of real wage rigidity, our finding of a low sensitivity of average labour
compensation and large volatility of labour in response to firm-specific TFP is consistent with the
hypothesis of real wage rigidity with respect to idiosyncratic productivity developments.
  In contrast to the response to idiosyncratic TFP, the elasticity of average labour compensation
to aggregate sector-level TFP is large, while that of labour is smaller. This is consistent with the
fact that aggregate shocks cannot be insured, contrary to idiosyncratic ones. It is also consistent
with the view that firms compete on the labour market to hire and keep workers, which makes them
reluctant to undertake individual wage cuts. With respect to this argument, our results support the
view that the high importance of centralised and coordinated wage bargaining at the sector level in
Belgium may ease wage adjustment to aggregate changes. Indeed, the response of average
labour compensation to sector-level TFP is large. Additional estimates suggest that (a large part of)
sector-specific TFP developments are transmitted to average labour compensation changes
through the sector-level collective wage agreements.
  Lastly, we provide microeconomic evidence that hours worked respond positively to TFP within
the year in our dataset. This is in contrast to the findings of Marchetti and Nucci (2005, 2007) for
Italy and Carlsson and Smedsaas (2007) for Sweden. We run several robustness tests and we find
our results robust to the specifications considered.25
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Appendix A: Data
A.1 Dataset
Section 2.2 provides a brief description of the data used in the paper. Here we describe the
technical details involved in construction of the dataset. We start with all firms that report their
annual accounts in Belgium. This represents nearly all active firms. In this study, we consider only
firms with 50 and more employees in manufacturing, construction and market services (NACE
codes DA-KK). Additional data trimming concerns the legal situation of the firm. Foreign and public
companies, as well as non-profit associations, are excluded from the sample. Only annual
accounts covering the period from January to December are considered in order to ensure
consistency between firms.
  Outliers are removed by excluding observations below the 1
st percentile or above the 99
th
percentile (defined year by year) of the following variables: employment growth (defined with
respect to the number of employees and full-time equivalents), level and growth of the average
wage per worker and average wage per hour, growth in firm-specific value added (in nominal and
real terms), hours per worker, and the investment-capital ratio.
  We consider only spells with at least 6 consecutive observations to make sure that sufficient
history is available to build lagged instruments in the GMM procedure. We exclude observations
with a missing value in any of the variables and in intermediate inputs. Last, we do not consider
sectors with either too few observations to obtain a reliable estimate of the production function, or
sectors where the production function coefficients were too far away from those obtained using
alternative estimation procedures and the income shares (see Appendix A.3). Table A1 shows the
composition of the dataset across the selected sectors.29
Table A1 - Composition of the data set
Sector NACE firms obs.
food DA 143 1038
textile DB 85 611
wood DD 17 124
paper DE 96 687
rubber DH 67 480
metals DJ 131 943
machinery and equipment DK 54 387
electrical equipment DL 60 424
other manufacturing DN 47 339
construction FF 249 1796
trade GG 333 2325
hotels and restaurants HH 29 203
financial services JJ 23 164
real estate KK 184 1250
total 1518 10771
A.2 Definitions of variables
  The nominal wage bill is defined as remuneration and direct social benefits. The real wage bill,
denoted by WBit, is obtained as deflated nominal wage bill, the deflator being the sector-specific
value added prices (31 branches).
  Employment,  abbreviated  as  Lit, is measured as the average number of employees in full-time
equivalent positions over the year.
  Hours  are  denoted  as  Hit and comprise the total number of hours worked at a firm in the
particular year. These are reported in the firms' annual accounts.
We measure average labour compensation per firm (Wit) by the total real wage bill divided by
the average number of full-time equivalent employees over the year.  Hourly labour compensation
per firm is given by the total real wage bill divided by the total number of hours worked over the
year.
  Variables related to workforce composition, like the percentage of blue-collar workers
(%BLUEit), the percentage of women (%WOMENit) and the proportion of workers with fixed-length
contracts (%TEMPit), are provided in the social balance sheet, which has formed part of firms'
annual accounts since 1996.
  Nominal value added for large firms is equal to operating income minus operating subsidies
and compensatory amounts received from public authorities, and the following operating charges:
raw materials consumables and services and other goods. For small firms, valued added is proxied
by the gross operating margin.
  Profits are measured after financial charges, depreciation, amortisation and taxes. The unit of
account for profits in our paper are millions of euro.
  Real values are obtained using the sectoral value added deflator.30
  The index of collectively agreed wage increases is constructed as follows. The nominal indices
of the collectively agreed nominal wage increases, defined at the sector-level separately for blue-
collar and white-collar workers, are published by the Ministry of Labour (more precisely, the
Federal Public Service Employment Labour and Social Dialogue) and we deflate it by the
corresponding sector-level value added deflator to obtain the real measure. We then take the
logarithm of the real indices for blue-collar workers and white-collar workers, I
B
st and I
W
st, and
multiply them by the percentage of blue-collar workers, %BLUEit, and white-collar workers,
%WHITEit in each firm. The measure is not perfect because collectively agreed wage increases are
defined at a more detailed level (in terms of sectors but also occupation and age or tenure).
Furthermore, discrepancies with the average wage bill changes may be due to the fact that
collective agreements do not apply to more flexible components of labour compensation such as
bonuses or premiums paid in addition to wages. Deviations from these collective agreements are
more frequent in large firms, and are very rare in the construction and business services sectors.
  The firm-level capital stock is constructed using the perpetual inventory method:
 P
I
stKit = (1-Gi)P
I
st-1Kit-1(P
I
st/P
I
st-1) + P
I
stIit
with Kit representing the real capital stock, P
I
st the sector-specific deflator on gross capital formation
and Gi the firm-specific depreciation rate. The initial nominal capital stock is given by the book
accounting value of the capital stock, plus revaluation gains, minus depreciation and amounts
written down, all at the end of the preceding period, from the earliest available annual account for
the firm. We use the full history of annual accounts, since 1985, to determine the initial capital
stock. The firm-specific depreciation rate is estimated as the median depreciation expenditure on
capital, over the years in which the firm is in business.
  Value  added  per  sector  (VAst) was obtained from national accounts statistics.
Table A.2 below reports descriptive statistics on the variable used, including the difference of
logarithm of our measure of firm-level TFP that we describe in the next section.31
Table A2 - Descriptive statistics
Variable obs. mean st dev. P5 median P95
Wit 10771 27904 8424 17542 26008 44539
Lit 10771 265.7 811.2 55.5 109.3 709.2
H/Lit 10771 1554 150 1301 1562 1777
WB/Hit 10771 17.91 4.86 11.86 16.84 27.4
'tfpit 10771 0.000 0.090 -0.14 0.00 0.12
Iit/Kit
(b) 10749 0.820 3.410 0.05 0.49 2.09
%BLUEit 10771 0.570 0.310 0.00 0.69 0.91
%TEMPit 10771 0.040 0.090 0.00 0.01 0.14
%WOMENit 10771 0.260 0.220 0.02 0.19 0.70
%L>100it 10771 0.560 0.500 0.00 1.00 1.00
'wit 10771 0.020 0.080 -0.10 0.01 0.14
'lit 10771 0.010 0.110 -0.13 0.01 0.18
'(h-l)it 10771 -0.010 0.060 -0.09 0.00 0.07
'(wb-h)it 10771 0.020 0.080 -0.09 0.02 0.15
'vast 104 0.015 0.052 -0.07 0.02 0.09
Notes: Descriptive statistics for firms with more than 50 employees and 6 consecutive annual accounts over
the years 1999-2005. P5 and P95 refer to the 5
th and 95
th percentile. Lowercase variables are in log.' stands
for the difference operator.
 W it : Real wage bill per average number of employees in euro.
 L it : Average number of employees over the year
 H/Lit : Total hours worker over the average number of employees
 WB/Hit : Real wage bill over the total number of hours worked
' tfpit : difference log of  firm-level TFP
 I it/Kit : Investment-capital ratio.
 %BLUEit : percentage of blue collar workers
 %TEMPit : percentage of employees under fixed-term contract
 %WOMENit : percentage of women
 %L>100it : dummy equals to one when the firm employs 100 workers or more
'vast : difference log of real value added at sector-level
A.3 Productivity estimates
Two important issues related to the estimation of productivity shocks have been raised in the
literature recently. First, factor demand is likely to be correlated with productivity shocks. Olley and
Pakes (1996) correct for this simultaneity bias by augmenting the production function equation with
a proxy of technological shocks based on investment and capital. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) use
intermediate inputs and capital as proxy.
  Second, estimated productivity shocks may capture variations in the rate of utilisation of
production factors. Indeed, with adjustment costs to input changes, firms may increase (decrease)
effort and hours worked after a productivity shock rather than undertake a costly increase
(decrease) in labour or capital. If this issue is ignored, the estimated residual will capture variations
in the rate of utilisation of production factors along with the "true" productivity shock. Basu and
Kimball (1997) develop a model where hours per worker are used to correct for this.
In this paper, we adopt the Ackerberg et al. (2006) estimation procedure that improves the
techniques developed by Olley-Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) in several32
directions. All three methods take into account the simultaneity bias due to the fact that factor
demand is correlated with productivity shocks, but not variable utilisation of production factors.
Ackerberg et al. (2006) correct for a colinearity issue that is present in the Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) and, to a lesser extent, Olley and Pakes (1996) procedures. Below, we first briefly describe
the Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approaches, and then explain the
Ackerberg et al. (2006) methodology.
  Consider  the  following  production  function:
 y it = ELlit + EKkit + zit + Kit ,
where the residual, zit + Kit is decomposed into one component observable to the firm when making
its input decision, zit, the productivity shock, and another component not observed by the firm at
that time, Kit, which can be associated with unexpected productivity changes as well as
measurement error. Because factor demand depends on productivity shocks, estimation of the
above equation suffers from a simultaneity problem since the error term, zit + Kit, is correlated with
labour, lit, and capital, kit.
  The estimation proceeds in two steps. First, a proxy for unobserved productivity, It(.), is
included in the equation to solve the simultaneity problem:
 y it = ELlit + EKkit + It(.) + Kit.
As shown in Olley and Pakes (1996), under some standard assumptions, the productivity shock
can be expressed as a polynomial function of investment and capital, It(iit,kit). Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) propose to use intermediate inputs instead of investment to solve the simultaneity bias,
It(mit,kit).26 Because kit also appears in the equation through It(.,kit), the parameter EK is not
identified. However, the equation provides an estimate of EL.
  In the second stage, the coefficient on capital is estimated. For this purpose, expressing
productivity as the sum of expected productivity, E[zit|zit-1], and productivity innovations, Zit, yields
 y it- L ˆ E lit = EKkit + E[zit|zit-1] + Zit + Kit.
Assuming that the capital stock in year t was built in period t-1 through iit-1, kit is independent of
productivity innovations, Zit. Therefore the proxy for expected productivity introduced in the
equation enables EK to be identified.
Finally, productivity growth is computed as it z ˆ d = dyit - L ˆ E dlit - K ˆ E dkit.
  Ackerberg et al. (2006) point out a fundamental colinearity problem that invalidates the
estimation of the labour coefficient, and consequently the capital coefficient in the above
26   The use of intermediate inputs was essentially motivated by data availability issues. In addition, as argued
by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), intermediate inputs may provide a better proxy of productivity growth if
they adjust more easily to productivity shocks than capital.33
procedures. In Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology, if labour decisions and intermediate
input decisions are taken simultaneously, i.e. if one assumes that both are flexible production
factors, labour is collinear with the non-parametric function that proxies for productivity, It(mit,kit).
This leaves the labour production coefficient unidentified in the first step. Ackerberg et al. (2006)
discuss in detail alternative assumptions concerning the timing of decisions on production factors
and productivity data-generating processes but find no realistic set of assumptions that can solve
the problem. The issue is less severe with the Olley and Pakes (1996) procedure, which remains
valid if one assumes that the labour input decision is taken under incomplete information about
productivity, while investment decisions are made after the productivity outcome is fully known.
  Ackerberg et al. (2006) then propose an alternative estimation procedure that makes it possible
to circumvent these issues, and is robust to a less restrictive set of assumptions.27 The main
feature of the estimation procedure is that the first stage equation is no longer used to estimate the
labour production coefficient. But it serves to isolate production (and therefore TFP estimates) from
the noise Kit, the unanticipated shocks at time t and measurement errors. All production function
parameters are estimated in the second-stage equation. Identification of the capital parameter is
again based on the assumption that the capital stock in period t was built through investment in
period t-1 and is therefore orthogonal to the productivity shock in t. Identification of the labour
parameter uses the fact that lagged labour does not react to current productivity shocks, contrary to
current labour. This defines a set of moment conditions used to estimate production function
parameters through the method of moments. Alternative identification set-ups can be used
according to the assumption made on labour decisions.
  Our estimates of the production function and TFP are based on the method proposed by
Ackerberg et al. (2006). Estimates using the Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003), not reported in the paper for the sake of brevity, yield less plausible production function
coefficients than the Ackerberg et al. (2006) procedure. Data availability pleads in favour of an
approach based on value added rather than gross output, seldom available for smaller firms. The
dataset differs slightly from the one described in Appendix A.1. To maximise the number of
observations on which our estimates are based, we include all firms disregarding their size and
remove the restriction on 6 consecutive observations. Estimation of production function parameters
is done separately for each sector. Three sectors were excluded because of insufficient number of
observations: electricity, gas and water (EE); coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel (DF); leather
and footwear (DC). We remove four additional sectors because the estimated coefficients do not
appear to be plausible when compared to the income shares of labour and capital, see Table A3
below.
27  Their procedure is consistent with the assumption that labour decisions may have an impact on future
output and profits. Because this is what may result from important features of labour market rigidities,
such as hiring, firing and training costs, it may be an important advantage of this procedure. When the
Ackerberg et al. (2006) procedure is applied with intermediate inputs to invert productivity, the procedure
is also consistent with unobservable and serially correlated variables affecting labour and capital
decisions.34
Table A3 - Estimated production function coefficients and income shares
Prod. function
coefficients Income shares
Sectors in the data set NACE capital labour capital labour
food DA 0.24 0.56 0.20 0.59
textile DB 0.12 0.50 0.25 0.69
wood DD 0.15 0.91 0.24 0.62
paper DE 0.11 0.52 0.17 0.63
rubber DH 0.17 0.85 0.20 0.65
metals DJ 0.28 0.44 0.17 0.74
machinery & equipment DK 0.19 0.46 0.14 0.70
electrical equipment DL 0.14 0.48 0.17 0.74
other manufacturing DN 0.36 0.34 0.23 0.67
construction FF 0.17 0.81 0.10 0.58
trade GG 0.13 0.87 0.13 0.56
hotels and restaurants HH 0.09 0.25 0.19 0.56
financial services JJ 0.11 0.30 0.16 0.60
real estate KK 0.26 0.66 0.22 0.29
mean 0.18 0.57 0.18 0.61
Sectors with unreliable coefficients
chemicals DG 0.11 1.15 0.13 0.57
non-metallic products DI  -0.02 1.19 0.19 0.65
transport equipment DM  -0.01 1.12 0.14 0.77
post and telecoms II 0.08 1.13 0.30 0.60
Note: The following sectors were excluded owing to an insufficient number of observations: electricity, gas and
water; coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel; leather and footwear.
  We also account for another problem related to traditional production function estimates put
forward by Basu and Kimball (1997). The assumption of constant rate of utilisation of production
factors may not be consistent with adjustment costs in labour and capital accumulation. When the
estimated productivity growth is not corrected for variable utilisation of production factors, it may be
correlated with variations in hours per worker. This in turn may induce a spurious correlation
between estimated productivity shocks and hours per worker. Basu and Kimball (1997) develop a
structural model of imperfect competition on the product market, perfect competition on factor
markets, increasing returns to scale and convex adjustment costs in both capital and number of
employees. In their model, the rate of utilisation of labour can be proxied by hours per worker.
Estimating TFP based on this methodology involves much more data and is beyond the scope of
this paper. However, we adopt a simple method that corrects for variation in hours per worker. We
simply regress our measure of TFP on hours per worker, and consider the residual from such
regression as the "corrected" TFP measure.
  Lastly, we decompose TFP into an idiosyncratic firm-level component and an aggregate sector-
level component. The measure of total TFP obtained from the Ackerberg et al. (2006) procedure is
estimated as zit= yit - it ˆ K - L ˆ E lit - K ˆ E kit. We regress this measure on hours per worker in order to35
account for the variable utilisation rate and on a set of sector-specific time dummies in order to
remove the sector-specific component from zit.  F i r m - l e v e l  T F P  i s  g i v e n  b y  t h e  r e s i d u a l  o f  t h i s
equation and sector-level TFP is obtained as the estimated sector-specific time dummies.NBB WORKING PAPER No. 159 - MARCH 2009 37
NATIONAL BANK OF BELGIUM - WORKING PAPERS SERIES
1.  "Model-based inflation forecasts and monetary policy rules" by M. Dombrecht and R. Wouters, Research
Series, February 2000.
2.  "The use of robust estimators as measures of core inflation" by L. Aucremanne, Research Series,
February 2000.
3.  "Performances économiques des Etats-Unis dans les années nonante" by A.  Nyssens, P.  Butzen,
P. Bisciari, Document Series, March 2000.
4.  "A model with explicit expectations for Belgium" by P. Jeanfils, Research Series, March 2000.
5.  "Growth in an open economy: some recent developments" by S. Turnovsky, Research Series, May 2000.
6.  "Knowledge, technology and economic growth: an OECD perspective" by I. Visco, A.  Bassanini,
S. Scarpetta, Research Series, May 2000.
7.  "Fiscal policy and growth in the context of European integration" by P. Masson, Research Series, May
2000.
8.  "Economic growth and the labour market: Europe's challenge" by C. Wyplosz, Research Series, May
2000.
9.  "The role of the exchange rate in economic growth: a euro-zone perspective" by R.  MacDonald,
Research Series, May 2000.
10.  "Monetary union and economic growth" by J. Vickers, Research Series, May 2000.
11.  "Politique monétaire et prix des actifs: le cas des Etats-Unis" by Q. Wibaut, Document Series, August
2000.
12.  "The Belgian industrial confidence indicator: leading indicator of economic activity in the euro area?" by
J.-J. Vanhaelen, L. Dresse, J. De Mulder, Document Series, November 2000.
13.  "Le financement des entreprises par capital-risque" by C. Rigo, Document Series, February 2001.
14.  "La nouvelle économie" by P. Bisciari, Document Series, March 2001.
15.  "De kostprijs van bankkredieten" by A. Bruggeman and R. Wouters, Document Series, April 2001.
16.  "A guided tour of the world of rational expectations models and optimal policies" by Ph.  Jeanfils,
Research Series, May 2001.
17.  "Attractive Prices and Euro - Rounding effects on inflation" by L. Aucremanne and D.  Cornille,
Documents Series, November 2001.
18.  "The interest rate and credit channels in Belgium: an investigation with micro-level firm data" by
P. Butzen, C. Fuss and Ph. Vermeulen, Research series, December 2001.
19.  "Openness, imperfect exchange rate pass-through and monetary policy" by F. Smets and R. Wouters,
Research series, March 2002.
20.  "Inflation, relative prices and nominal rigidities" by L. Aucremanne, G. Brys, M. Hubert, P. J. Rousseeuw
and A. Struyf, Research series, April 2002.
21.  "Lifting the burden: fundamental tax reform and economic growth" by D. Jorgenson, Research series,
May 2002.
22.  "What do we know about investment under uncertainty?" by L. Trigeorgis, Research series, May 2002.
23.  "Investment, uncertainty and irreversibility: evidence from Belgian accounting data" by D.  Cassimon,
P.-J. Engelen, H. Meersman, M. Van Wouwe, Research series, May 2002.
24.  "The impact of uncertainty on investment plans" by P. Butzen, C. Fuss, Ph. Vermeulen, Research series,
May 2002.
25.  "Investment, protection, ownership, and the cost of capital" by Ch.  P.  Himmelberg, R.  G.  Hubbard,
I. Love, Research series, May 2002.
26.  "Finance, uncertainty and investment: assessing the gains and losses of a generalised non-linear
structural approach using Belgian panel data", by M.  Gérard, F.  Verschueren, Research series,
May 2002.
27.  "Capital structure, firm liquidity and growth" by R. Anderson, Research series, May 2002.
28.  "Structural modelling of investment and financial constraints: where do we stand?" by J.- B. Chatelain,
Research series, May 2002.
29.  "Financing and investment interdependencies in unquoted Belgian companies: the role of venture
capital" by S. Manigart, K. Baeyens, I. Verschueren, Research series, May 2002.
30.  "Development path and capital structure of Belgian biotechnology firms" by V.  Bastin, A.  Corhay,
G. Hübner, P.-A. Michel, Research series, May 2002.
31.  "Governance as a source of managerial discipline" by J. Franks, Research series, May 2002.NBB WORKING PAPER No. 159 - MARCH 2009 38
32.  "Financing constraints, fixed capital and R&D investment decisions of Belgian firms" by M.  Cincera,
Research series, May 2002.
33.  "Investment, R&D and liquidity constraints: a corporate governance approach to the Belgian evidence"
by P. Van Cayseele, Research series, May 2002.
34.  "On the Origins of the Franco-German EMU Controversies" by I. Maes, Research series, July 2002.
35.  "An estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of the Euro Area", by F.  Smets and
R. Wouters, Research series, October 2002.
36.  "The labour market and fiscal impact of labour tax reductions: The case of reduction of employers' social
security contributions under a wage norm regime with automatic price indexing of wages", by
K. Burggraeve and Ph. Du Caju, Research series, March 2003.
37.  "Scope of asymmetries in the Euro Area", by S. Ide and Ph. Moës, Document series, March 2003.
38.  "De autonijverheid in België: Het belang van het toeleveringsnetwerk rond de assemblage van
personenauto's", by F. Coppens and G. van Gastel, Document series, June 2003.
39.  "La consommation privée en Belgique", by B. Eugène, Ph. Jeanfils and B. Robert, Document series,
June 2003.
40.  "The process of European monetary integration: a comparison of the Belgian and Italian approaches", by
I. Maes and L. Quaglia, Research series, August 2003.
41.  "Stock market valuation in the United States", by P. Bisciari, A. Durré and A. Nyssens, Document series,
November 2003.
42.  "Modeling the Term Structure of Interest Rates: Where Do We Stand?, by K. Maes, Research series,
February 2004.
43.  "Interbank Exposures: An Empirical Examination of System Risk in the Belgian Banking System", by
H. Degryse and G. Nguyen, Research series, March 2004.
44.  "How Frequently do Prices change? Evidence Based on the Micro Data Underlying the Belgian CPI", by
L. Aucremanne and E. Dhyne, Research series, April 2004.
45. "Firms' investment decisions in response to demand and price uncertainty", by C.  Fuss and
Ph. Vermeulen, Research series, April 2004.
46.  "SMEs and Bank Lending Relationships: the Impact of Mergers", by H. Degryse, N. Masschelein and
J. Mitchell, Research series, May 2004.
47.  "The Determinants of Pass-Through of Market Conditions to Bank Retail Interest Rates in Belgium", by
F. De Graeve, O. De Jonghe and R. Vander Vennet, Research series, May 2004.
48.  "Sectoral vs. country diversification benefits and downside risk", by M. Emiris, Research series,
May 2004.
49.  "How does liquidity react to stress periods in a limit order market?", by H. Beltran, A. Durré and P. Giot,
Research series, May 2004.
50. "Financial consolidation and liquidity: prudential regulation and/or competition policy?", by
P. Van Cayseele, Research series, May 2004.
51.  "Basel II and Operational Risk: Implications for risk measurement and management in the financial
sector", by A. Chapelle, Y. Crama, G. Hübner and J.-P. Peters, Research series, May 2004.
52.  "The Efficiency and Stability of Banks and Markets", by F. Allen, Research series, May 2004.
53.  "Does Financial Liberalization Spur Growth?" by G. Bekaert, C.R. Harvey and C. Lundblad, Research
series, May 2004.
54.  "Regulating Financial Conglomerates", by X. Freixas, G. Lóránth, A.D. Morrison and H.S. Shin, Research
series, May 2004.
55.  "Liquidity and Financial Market Stability", by M. O'Hara, Research series, May 2004.
56.  "Economisch belang van de Vlaamse zeehavens: verslag 2002", by F.  Lagneaux, Document series,
June 2004.
57.  "Determinants of Euro Term Structure of Credit Spreads", by A.  Van Landschoot, Research series,
July 2004.
58.  "Macroeconomic and Monetary Policy-Making at the European Commission, from the Rome Treaties to
the Hague Summit", by I. Maes, Research series, July 2004.
59.  "Liberalisation of Network Industries: Is Electricity an Exception to the Rule?", by F. Coppens and
D. Vivet, Document series, September 2004.
60.  "Forecasting with a Bayesian DSGE model: an application to the euro area", by F. Smets and
R. Wouters, Research series, September 2004.
61.  "Comparing shocks and frictions in US and Euro Area Business Cycle: a Bayesian DSGE approach", by
F. Smets and R. Wouters, Research series, October 2004.NBB WORKING PAPER No. 159 - MARCH 2009 39
62.  "Voting on Pensions: A Survey", by G. de Walque, Research series, October 2004.
63.  "Asymmetric Growth and Inflation Developments in the Acceding Countries: A New Assessment", by
S. Ide and P. Moës, Research series, October 2004.
64.  "Importance économique du Port Autonome de Liège: rapport 2002", by F. Lagneaux, Document series,
November 2004.
65.  "Price-setting behaviour in Belgium: what can be learned from an ad hoc survey", by L. Aucremanne and
M. Druant, Research series, March 2005.
66.  "Time-dependent versus State-dependent Pricing: A Panel Data Approach to the Determinants of
Belgian Consumer Price Changes", by L. Aucremanne and E. Dhyne, Research series, April 2005.
67.  "Indirect effects – A formal definition and degrees of dependency as an alternative to technical
coefficients", by F. Coppens, Research series, May 2005.
68.  "Noname – A new quarterly model for Belgium", by Ph. Jeanfils and K. Burggraeve, Research series,
May 2005.
69.  "Economic importance of the Flemish maritime ports: report 2003", F. Lagneaux, Document series, May
2005.
70.  "Measuring inflation persistence: a structural time series approach", M. Dossche and G.  Everaert,
Research series, June 2005.
71.  "Financial intermediation theory and implications for the sources of value in structured finance markets",
J. Mitchell, Document series, July 2005.
72.  "Liquidity risk in securities settlement", J. Devriese and J. Mitchell, Research series, July 2005.
73.  "An international analysis of earnings, stock prices and bond yields", A. Durré and P. Giot, Research
series, September 2005.
74.  "Price setting in the euro area: Some stylized facts from Individual Consumer Price Data", E. Dhyne,
L. J. Álvarez, H. Le Bihan, G. Veronese, D. Dias, J. Hoffmann, N. Jonker, P. Lünnemann, F. Rumler and
J. Vilmunen, Research series, September 2005.
75.  "Importance économique du Port Autonome de Liège: rapport 2003", by F. Lagneaux, Document series,
October 2005.
76.  "The pricing behaviour of firms in the euro area: new survey evidence, by S.  Fabiani, M.  Druant,
I.  Hernando,  C.  Kwapil,  B.  Landau,  C.  Loupias,  F.  Martins,  T.  Mathä,  R.  Sabbatini,  H.  Stahl  and
A. Stokman, Research series, November 2005.
77.  "Income uncertainty and aggregate consumption, by L. Pozzi, Research series, November 2005.
78.  "Crédits aux particuliers - Analyse des données de la Centrale des Crédits aux Particuliers", by
H. De Doncker, Document series, January 2006.
79.  "Is there a difference between solicited and unsolicited bank ratings and, if so, why?" by P. Van Roy,
Research series, February 2006.
80.  "A generalised dynamic factor model for the Belgian economy - Useful business cycle indicators and
GDP growth forecasts", by Ch. Van Nieuwenhuyze, Research series, February 2006.
81.  "Réduction linéaire de cotisations patronales à la sécurité sociale et financement alternatif" by
Ph. Jeanfils, L. Van Meensel, Ph. Du Caju, Y. Saks, K. Buysse and K. Van Cauter, Document series,
March 2006.
82.  "The patterns and determinants of price setting in the Belgian industry" by D. Cornille and M. Dossche,
Research series, May 2006.
83.  "A multi-factor model for the valuation and risk management of demand deposits" by H.  Dewachter,
M. Lyrio and K. Maes, Research series, May 2006.
84.  "The single European electricity market: A long road to convergence", by F.  Coppens and D.  Vivet,
Document series, May 2006.
85.  "Firm-specific production factors in a DSGE model with Taylor price setting", by G. de Walque, F. Smets
and R. Wouters, Research series, June 2006.
86.  "Economic importance of the Belgian ports: Flemish maritime ports and Liège port complex - report
2004", by F. Lagneaux, Document series, June 2006.
87.  "The response of firms' investment and financing to adverse cash flow shocks: the role of bank
relationships", by C. Fuss and Ph. Vermeulen, Research series, July 2006.
88.  "The term structure of interest rates in a DSGE model", by M. Emiris, Research series, July 2006.
89.  "The production function approach to the Belgian output gap, Estimation of a Multivariate Structural Time
Series Model", by Ph. Moës, Research series, September 2006.
90.  "Industry Wage Differentials, Unobserved Ability, and Rent-Sharing: Evidence from Matched Worker-
Firm Data, 1995-2002", by R. Plasman, F. Rycx and I. Tojerow, Research series, October 2006.NBB WORKING PAPER No. 159 - MARCH 2009 40
91.  "The dynamics of trade and competition", by N. Chen, J. Imbs and A. Scott, Research series, October
2006.
92.  "A New Keynesian Model with Unemployment", by O. Blanchard and J. Gali, Research series, October
2006.
93.  "Price and Wage Setting in an Integrating Europe: Firm Level Evidence", by F. Abraham, J. Konings and
S. Vanormelingen, Research series, October 2006.
94.  "Simulation, estimation and welfare implications of monetary policies in a 3-country NOEM model", by
J. Plasmans, T. Michalak and J. Fornero, Research series, October 2006.
95.  "Inflation persistence and price-setting behaviour in the euro area: a summary of the Inflation Persistence
Network evidence ", by F. Altissimo, M. Ehrmann and F. Smets, Research series, October 2006.
96.  "How Wages Change: Micro Evidence from the International Wage Flexibility Project", by W.T. Dickens,
L. Goette, E.L. Groshen, S. Holden, J. Messina, M.E. Schweitzer, J. Turunen and M. Ward, Research
series, October 2006.
97.  "Nominal wage rigidities in a new Keynesian model with frictional unemployment", by V.  Bodart,
G. de Walque, O. Pierrard, H.R. Sneessens and R. Wouters, Research series, October 2006.
98.  "Dynamics on monetary policy in a fair wage model of the business cycle", by D.  De la Croix,
G. de Walque and R. Wouters, Research series, October 2006.
99.  "The kinked demand curve and price rigidity: evidence from scanner data", by M. Dossche, F. Heylen
and D. Van den Poel, Research series, October 2006.
100. "Lumpy price adjustments: a microeconometric analysis", by E.  Dhyne, C.  Fuss, H.  Peseran and
P. Sevestre, Research series, October 2006.
101. "Reasons for wage rigidity in Germany", by W. Franz and F. Pfeiffer, Research series, October 2006.
102. "Fiscal sustainability indicators and policy design in the face of ageing", by G. Langenus, Research
series, October 2006.
103. "Macroeconomic fluctuations and firm entry: theory and evidence", by V. Lewis, Research series,
October 2006.
104. "Exploring the CDS-Bond Basis" by J. De Wit, Research series, November 2006.
105. "Sector Concentration in Loan Portfolios and Economic Capital", by K. Düllmann and N. Masschelein,
Research series, November 2006.
106. "R&D in the Belgian Pharmaceutical Sector", by H. De Doncker, Document series, December 2006.
107. "Importance et évolution des investissements directs en Belgique", by Ch.  Piette, Document series,
January 2007.
108. "Investment-Specific Technology Shocks and Labor Market Frictions", by R. De Bock, Research series,
February 2007.
109. "Shocks and frictions in US Business cycles: a Bayesian DSGE Approach", by F. Smets and R. Wouters,
Research series, February 2007.
110. "Economic impact of port activity: a disaggregate analysis. The case of Antwerp", by F.  Coppens,
F.  Lagneaux,  H.  Meersman,  N.  Sellekaerts,  E.  Van de  Voorde, G.  van  Gastel,  Th.  Vanelslander,
A. Verhetsel, Document series, February 2007.
111.  "Price setting in the euro area: some stylised facts from individual producer price data", by
Ph. Vermeulen, D. Dias, M. Dossche, E. Gautier, I. Hernando, R. Sabbatini, H. Stahl, Research series,
March 2007.
112. "Assessing the Gap between Observed and Perceived Inflation in the Euro Area: Is the Credibility of the
HICP at Stake?", by L. Aucremanne, M. Collin, Th. Stragier, Research series, April 2007.
113. "The spread of Keynesian economics: a comparison of the Belgian and Italian experiences", by I. Maes,
Research series, April 2007.
114. "Imports and Exports at the Level of the Firm: Evidence from Belgium", by M. Muûls and M.  Pisu,
Research series, May 2007.
115. "Economic importance of the Belgian ports: Flemish maritime ports and Liège port complex - report
2005", by F. Lagneaux, Document series, May 2007.
116. "Temporal Distribution of Price Changes: Staggering in the Large and Synchronization in the Small", by
E. Dhyne and J. Konieczny, Research series, June 2007.
117. "Can excess liquidity signal an asset price boom?", by A. Bruggeman, Research series, August 2007.
118. "The performance of credit rating systems in the assessment of collateral used in Eurosystem monetary
policy operations", by F. Coppens, F. González and G. Winkler, Research series, September 2007.
119. "The determinants of stock and bond return comovements", by L. Baele, G. Bekaert and K. Inghelbrecht,
Research series, October 2007.NBB WORKING PAPER No. 159 - MARCH 2009 41
120. "Monitoring pro-cyclicality under the capital requirements directive: preliminary concepts for developing a
framework", by N. Masschelein, Document series, October 2007.
121.  "Dynamic order submission strategies with competition between a dealer market and a crossing
network", by H. Degryse, M. Van Achter and G. Wuyts, Research series, November 2007.
122. "The gas chain: influence of its specificities on the liberalisation process", by C. Swartenbroekx,
Document series, November 2007.
123. "Failure prediction models: performance, disagreements, and internal rating systems", by J. Mitchell and
P. Van Roy, Research series, December 2007.
124. "Downward wage rigidity for different workers and firms: an evaluation for Belgium using the IWFP
procedure", by Ph. Du Caju, C. Fuss and L. Wintr, Research series, December 2007.
125. "Economic importance of Belgian transport logistics", by F. Lagneaux, Document series, January 2008.
126. "Some evidence on late bidding in eBay auctions", by L. Wintr, Research series, January 2008.
127. "How do firms adjust their wage bill in Belgium? A decomposition along the intensive and extensive
margins", by C. Fuss, Research series, January 2008.
128. "Exports and productivity – comparable evidence for 14 countries", by The International Study Group on
Exports and Productivity, Research series, February 2008.
129. "Estimation of monetary policy preferences in a forward-looking model: a Bayesian approach", by
P. Ilbas, Research series, March 2008.
130. "Job creation, job destruction and firms' international trade involvement", by M. Pisu, Research series,
March 2008.
131. "Do survey indicators let us see the business cycle? A frequency decomposition", by L. Dresse and
Ch. Van Nieuwenhuyze, Research series, March 2008.
132. "Searching for additional sources of inflation persistence: the micro-price panel data approach", by
R. Raciborski, Research series, April 2008.
133. "Short-term forecasting of GDP using large monthly datasets - A pseudo real-time forecast evaluation
exercise", by K. Barhoumi, S. Benk, R. Cristadoro, A. Den Reijer, A. Jakaitiene, P. Jelonek, A. Rua,
G. Rünstler, K. Ruth and Ch. Van Nieuwenhuyze, Research series, June 2008.
134. "Economic importance of the Belgian ports: Flemish maritime ports, Liège port complex and the port of
Brussels - report 2006" by S. Vennix, Document series, June 2008.
135. "Imperfect exchange rate pass-through: the role of distribution services and variable demand elasticity",
by Ph. Jeanfils, Research series, August 2008.
136. "Multivariate structural time series models with dual cycles: Implications for measurement of output gap
and potential growth", by Ph. Moës, Research series, August 2008.
137. "Agency problems in structured finance - a case study of European CLOs", by J. Keller, Document
series, August 2008.
138. "The efficiency frontier as a method for gauging the performance of public expenditure: a Belgian case
study", by B. Eugène, Research series, September 2008.
139. "Exporters and credit constraints. A firm-level approach", by M. Muûls, Research series, September
2008.
140. "Export destinations and learning-by-exporting: Evidence from Belgium", by M. Pisu, Research series,
September 2008.
141. "Monetary aggregates and liquidity in a neo-Wicksellian framework", by M.  Canzoneri, R.  Cumby,
B. Diba and D. López-Salido, Research series, October 2008.
142  "Liquidity, inflation and asset prices in a time-varying framework for the euro area, by Ch. Baumeister,
E. Durinck and G. Peersman, Research series, October 2008.
143. "The bond premium in a DSGE model with long-run real and nominal risks", by Glenn D. Rudebusch and
Eric T. Swanson, Research series, October 2008.
144. "Imperfect information, macroeconomic dynamics and the yield curve: an encompassing macro-finance
model", by H. Dewachter, Research series, October 2008.
145. "Housing market spillovers: evidence from an estimated DSGE model", by M. Iacoviello and S. Neri,
Research series, October 2008.
146.  "Credit frictions and optimal monetary policy", by V.  Cúrdia and M.  Woodford, Research series,
October 2008.
147. "Central Bank misperceptions and the role of money in interest rate rules", by G. Beck and V. Wieland,
Research series, October 2008.
148. "Financial (in)stability, supervision and liquidity injections: a dynamic general equilibrium approach", by
G. de Walque, O. Pierrard and A. Rouabah, Research series, October 2008.NBB WORKING PAPER No. 159 - MARCH 2009 42
149.  "Monetary policy, asset prices and macroeconomic conditions: a panel-VAR study", by
K. Assenmacher-Wesche and S. Gerlach, Research series, October 2008.
150. "Risk premiums and macroeconomic dynamics in a heterogeneous agent model", by F. De Graeve,
M. Dossche, M. Emiris, H. Sneessens and R. Wouters, Research series, October 2008.
151. "Financial factors in economic fluctuations", by L. J. Christiano, R. Motto and M. Rotagno, Research
series, to be published.
152. "Rent-sharing under different bargaining regimes: Evidence from linked employer-employee data" by
M. Rusinek and F. Rycx, Research series, December 2008.
153. "Forecast with judgment and models" by F. Monti, Research series, December 2008.
154. "Institutional features of wage bargaining in 23 European countries, the US and Japan" by Ph. Du Caju,
E. Gautier, D. Momferatou and M. Ward-Warmedinger, Research series, December 2008.
155. "Fiscal sustainability  and policy implications for the euro area" by F. Balassone, J. Cunha, G. Langenus,
B. Manzke, J Pavot, D. Prammer and P. Tommasino, Research series, January 2009.
156. "Understanding sectoral differences in downward real wage rigidity: workforce composition, institutions,
  technology and competition" by Ph. Du Caju, C. Fuss and L. Wintr, Research series, February 2009.
157. "Sequential bargaining in a New Keynesian model with frictional unemployment and staggered wage
negotiation", by G. de Walque, O. Pierrard, H. Sneessens and R. Wouters, Research series, February
2009.
158. "Economic Importance of Air Transport and Airport Activities in Belgium", by F. Kupfer and F. Lagneaux,
Document series, March 2009.
159. "Rigid labour compensation and flexible employment? Firm-Level evidence with regard to productivity for
Belgium", by C. Fuss and L. Wintr, Research series, March 2009.